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Abstract
This paper seeks to show how MacIntyre’s concept of a practice can survive a series of ‘scope problems’ which threaten to 
render the concept inapplicable to business ethics. I begin by outlining MacIntyre’s concept of a practice before arguing that, 
despite an asymmetry between productive and non-productive practices, the elasticity of the concept of a practice allows us 
to accommodate productive and proitable activities. This elasticity of practices allows us to sidestep the problem of adju-
dicating between practitioners and non-practitioners as well as the problem of generic activities. I conclude by suggesting 
that the contemporary tendency to regard work as an object of consumption, rather than undermining MacIntyre’s account 
of practices, serves to demonstrate the potential breadth of its applicability.
Keywords MacIntyre · Virtue ethics · Practices
Introduction
Despite his own scepticism about business ethics, Alasdair 
MacIntyre has been extremely inluential within the ield, 
and, as Ferrero and Sison (2014) note, has been cited in the 
business ethics literature more often than any virtue ethicist 
other than Aristotle. This inluence is due in large part to 
MacIntyre’s concept of a practice. There have been a num-
ber of scholarly contributions to the literature on MacIntyre 
and business ethics which have explored the concept of a 
practice (such as Beadle 2008, 2013; Beadle and Knight 
2012; Beabout 2013; Garcia-Ruiz and Rodriguez-Lluesma 
2014; McPherson 2013; Moore 2002, 2012a, b, 2015). As 
this literature reveals, the concept remains the subject of 
much debate amongst business ethicists. Furthermore, there 
have been numerous articles which aim to show that some 
particular activity or form of work its MacIntyre’s descrip-
tion of a practice. Examples include business (Kay 1997), 
management (Brewer 1997), nursing (Sellman 2000), public 
relations (Leeper and Leeper 2001), teaching (Dunne 2003), 
journalism (Borden 2007), ire-ighting (Dawson 2014), 
investment advising (Wyma 2015), and accounting (West 
2016). The frequency with which such cases for particular 
forms of employment counting as practices are made sug-
gests that the scope of MacIntyre’s concept of a practice is 
not entirely clear. In this paper, I explore this concept, focus-
ing in particular on the notion of engagement in a practice, 
with the aim of elucidating how MacIntyre’s ethical theory 
might be applied to business ethics.
One of the main reasons MacIntyre’s concept of a 
practice has been appealing to business ethicists is that it, 
potentially at least, seems to “ofer the best understand-
ing of the promise of work” (Muirhead 2004, p. 167) and 
provides a model of what human production could be 
like at its best (Keat 2015, p. 202). This is because it is, 
again potentially, able to show how good work can be both 
intrinsically satisfying and morally educative. Indeed, this 
potential is why it is worth exploring the scope of MacIn-
tyre’s concept. Many business ethicists remain sceptical 
about the worth of MacIntyre’s work and have questioned 
whether it can be applied to market-driven institutions 
(e.g. Dobson 2009; Hartman 2013, 2015). Any attempt to 
apply MacIntyre’s thought to business ethics is likely to 
be critical of the avarice characteristic of certain parts of 
advanced capitalist society, and indeed MacIntyre him-
self suggests that avarice (‘pleonexia’) is a “highly valued 
character trait”, even “a duty” (2016, p. 127), in contem-
porary capitalist society. However, in this paper I aim to 
bolster the argumentative resources of those who think 
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MacIntyre’s work can be, and is, a valuable tool for busi-
ness ethicists and organisational scholars both by ofering 
a close reading of MacIntyre’s concept of a practice and by 
analysing the concept of engagement in practices.
In the following section, I outline the concept of a prac-
tice and highlight a series of challenges facing MacIntyre 
posed by Hager, which lead him to suggest we must ‘refur-
bish’ MacIntyre’s concept. These are: (1) the problem of 
accounting for “practical and productive activities” (Hager 
2011, p. 548) which are more intimately bound up with 
the pursuit of external goods than non-productive prac-
tices, an issue which has also been raised by a number 
of other commentators, (2) the problem of adjudicating 
between who is and who is not engaged in a practice, and 
(3) the problem generic activities pose for our ability to 
set boundaries between related practices.
I aim to ofer a response, albeit a sympathetic one, to 
these challenges. I do so irst, by arguing that there is an 
important asymmetry between what might be called pre-
dominantly productive and predominantly non-productive 
practices. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, pre-
dominantly productive practices that aim at some distinct 
social good beyond themselves (e.g. farming, which aims 
to produce food) are not susceptible to the historical pro-
gression characteristic of the more clearly paradigmatic 
and predominantly non-productive practices (e.g. phys-
ics). Secondly, accounts of productive practices typically 
appeal to the broader community in which the practice is 
housed, such as a ishing village (MacIntyre 1994), to a 
degree that is not the case in accounts of more paradig-
matic, non-productive practices, e.g. various arts and sci-
ences. Thirdly, there seems to be a key diference in the 
criteria for excellence in productive and non-productive 
practices. Nevertheless, I suggest this does not undermine 
the applicability of the concept to productive activities, it 
simply means we need to look more closely at the concept 
of engagement in a practice. I then seek to respond to 
Hager’s second and third challenges by doing just this. 
I argue that even a relatively minimal engagement in a 
practice can, in principle, be morally educative. Even if 
we cannot provide necessary and suicient conditions 
for either engagement in a practice or for the conceptual 
boundaries of any particular practice, the concept is not 
thereby undermined.
In the inal section, I draw on some existing research 
inspired by MacIntyre to outline the prospects for appli-
cations of MacIntyrean research in business ethics. I will 
ultimately conclude that MacIntyre’s work can be used to 
explore the ethical quality of work beyond employment 
in paradigmatic practices and that the tendency to regard 
work as an object of consumption is more ethically prom-
ising than it may appear.
The Concept of a Practice
MacIntyre outlines a neo-Aristotelian conception of vir-
tue, at the core of which is his notion of a practice. The 
term ‘practice’ has been widely employed by philosophers, 
and MacIntyre’s use difers from that of igures such as 
Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Brandom (see Knight 2008, 
2013 for detailed discussion of how MacIntyre’s concept 
compares to these alternatives). Practices, for MacIn-
tyre, are those activities which possess complex inter-
nal goods, are intrinsically rewarding, and serve as the 
primary basis of his account of the virtues. To this basis 
in practices, MacIntyre adds the concept of the narrative 
unity of human life, the concept of traditions of enquiry 
(2007 [originally published 1981]), which received further 
elaboration in later works (1988, 1990; see also Lutz 2004; 
Nicholas 2012), and a conception of lourishing rooted in 
human biology (1999), each of which is necessary for a 
full understanding of the virtues. Practices, however, are 
of vital importance and provide the conceptual bedrock 
of MacIntyre’s ethical theory. According to MacIntyre’s 
deinition, a ‘practice’ is a:
coherent and complex form of socially established 
co-operative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excel-
lence which are appropriate to, and partially dein-
itive of, that form of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human 
conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are sys-
tematically extended. (2007, p. 187)
Despite the prolixity of this deinition, practices are not to 
be regarded as esoteric activities available only to a few, 
but rather as a ubiquitous feature of human societies, and 
present in every human life. Even if practices are central in 
some societies and relatively marginalised in others (2007, 
p. 193), all of us engage in practices of one sort or another. 
As Knight says, it is “by participating in shared social 
practices that we come to learn the reality of goods other 
than the satisfaction of our socially ‘untutored’ desires” 
(2009, p. 117). While, as Keat (2008) points out, MacIn-
tyre’s account of the good is not comprehensive, some-
thing MacIntyre readily admits (e.g. 2008a, p. 268; 2016, 
p. 315), his concept of a practice nevertheless provides a 
powerful basis for an account of moral education and of 
the ethically ameliorative role good work can play in our 
lives.
Practices require us to acquire the virtues because it 
is only through virtue acquisition that we can properly 
experience the internal goods practices make available. 
On MacIntyre’s view, our attempts to improve ourselves 
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so as to master some rewarding activity are more efective 
as a moral education than any formal ethics course could 
be (see MacIntyre 2015). Some virtues, such as justice, 
truthfulness, constancy and courage, are required by all 
practices, and thus practices are well placed to enable us 
to develop a good character. Unless we are prepared to 
give and receive honest criticism, for example, we will 
never be able to experience the satisfactions practices can 
provide. Virtues are not only, or even especially, exhibited 
in the context of practices, but they are learned in such 
contexts. As MacIntyre says, “the exercise of the virtues is 
something learned in the context of practices… those who 
engage in practices need the virtues if they are to achieve 
the individual and common goods internal to practices” 
(2013, p. 216). So, not only are practices intrinsically sat-
isfying and inherently worthwhile, they are also morally 
educative. Indeed, just as virtues are internal rather than 
external means to the end of human lourishing in the Aris-
totelian tradition, practices are internal means to virtue 
acquisition.
MacIntyre illustrates the concept of practices with the 
following examples: architecture, chess, portrait painting, 
physics, football and farming. By contrast, bricklaying, 
throwing or kicking a ball with skill, and turnip-planting, are 
not practices (2007, p. 187). What are we to make of MacIn-
tyre’s list of examples? It is possible, given that practices can 
only be fully understood by those with relevant experience, 
that MacIntyre is mistaken about some particular example 
and has underestimated the goods inherent to bricklaying, 
for instance. However, taken as illustrations rather than a 
canonical list, they serve their purpose.
Farming, the most obviously productive practice on 
MacIntyre’s list of examples, is more complex and socially 
established than turnip-planting. It might be tempting to 
think that farming deserves the status of practice, whereas 
turnip-planting does not, on the grounds that the former is 
more enjoyable. However, as Beadle and Knight (2012) have 
shown, MacIntyrean accounts of work must resist appeals 
to mere subjective satisfaction, even if, as I will argue later, 
subjective satisfaction is a necessary component of engage-
ment in a practice. According to MacIntyre, “a practice, in 
the sense intended, is never just a set of technical skills, even 
when directed towards some uniied purpose and even if the 
exercise of those skills can on occasion be valued or enjoyed 
for their own sake” (2007, p. 193). Unusual cases of people 
becoming fascinated and delighted by simple, incoherent 
or horrible activities are, therefore, never to be regarded as 
counter-examples. Rather than seeing MacIntyre’s deini-
tion as an austere and perhaps arbitrary stipulation regard-
ing which activities can provide a basis for his deinition of 
virtues, we should read it as a considered description of the 
sorts of activities that are morally educative and intrinsically 
rewarding as a result of their distinctive qualities. Thus, the 
central question is whether some form of activity is beitting 
the most worthwhile kinds of human life we can imagine, 
given the sorts of creatures we are.
Practices must have a coherent core to allow for the 
gradual progression of standards of excellence and must be 
complex in order to be able to be suiciently challenging and 
fulilling. This complexity is what prevents engagement in a 
practice from becoming monotonous. Non-complex activi-
ties, such as planting turnips or throwing a ball, will not 
be morally educative as they will not require the virtues. 
Although such activities may require much repetition, this 
does not imply that they can teach us perseverance, as the 
virtue of perseverance is only what it is when it serves some 
worthwhile end.
The process of learning required to be a ‘master’ turnip 
planter, if this concept is intelligible, is insuiciently com-
plex to generate the relection and commitment required by 
practices, and as such does not exhibit the other deinitive 
features of practices. For example, simple activities will not 
be cooperative in the requisite sense. Practices must also be 
cooperative because we are typically unable to correct our 
own mistakes when beginning to engage in a practice, and 
are sometimes incapable even of perceiving those mistakes. 
This brings us to another key feature of practices: the role 
played by a particular community of practitioners within a 
particular tradition of practice. MacIntyre claims that to,
enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not 
only with contemporary practitioners, but also with 
those who have preceded us in the practice… Practices 
never have a goal or goals ixed for all time – paint-
ing has no such goal nor has physics – but the goods 
themselves are transmuted by the history of the activ-
ity. (2007, p. 194)
In attempting to master a particular practice, we must engage 
with and learn from our contemporary fellow practitioners, 
with whom we can discuss the practice, share advice, and 
give and receive encouragement and criticism. It is with 
these fellows that we are able to discuss the relevant stand-
ards of excellence which go beyond any subjective enjoy-
ments provided by the practice in question, and in this sense 
practices also have a signiicant historical element, which 
we will return to below with reference to the asymmetry 
between productive and non-productive practices.
The most important element of MacIntyre’s deinition of 
a practice is that of internal goods, which are to be con-
trasted with external goods. External goods, for MacIntyre, 
include power, prestige and money, which can always be 
secured in a variety of ways. Internal goods, by contrast, 
can only be achieved by engaging in the particular prac-
tices they are partially deinitive of. For example, a painter 
might sell a painting, but the money thereby acquired could 
have been acquired by gardening, telemarketing, or theft. 
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The money earned by the sale is only contingently related 
to the activity of painting. The internal goods of painting, 
on the other hand, cannot be achieved by engaging in other 
activities. External goods are good and must be secured by 
institutions which support practices in order to protect those 
practices. Nevertheless, whereas external goods are always 
someone’s property and possession (2007, p. 188), internal 
goods are not limited in this way, and so are not liable to be 
part of a zero-sum game. The concept of internal goods most 
clearly reveals how practices are morally educative because 
the pursuit of internal goods requires us to develop the vir-
tues. Without discipline and self-honesty, for instance, no 
painter will be able to improve. Without humility, no painter 
will be able to subordinate him or herself to the standards 
of excellence characteristic of painting’s community and 
history. The intrinsic joys provided by practices give us a 
reason to attempt to acquire the virtues. Moreover, once a 
virtue has been properly acquired, it can be exhibited out-
side of the context in which it was learned, and ultimately 
valued in itself.
The concept of a practice has been criticised in a variety 
of ways. Lutz (2004) deals expertly with objections from 
relativism (Wachbroit 1985) and the possibility of evil prac-
tices (Feldman 1986), amongst others. Here, I focus on three 
‘scope problems’ put forward by Hager (2011), all of which 
threaten to undermine the applicability of MacIntyre’s con-
cept. The irst scope problem relates to the lack of considera-
tion productive activities receive in MacIntyre’s account of 
practices: unless it can be shown that productive activities 
answer to MacIntyre’s deinition of a practice, the concept 
will be inapplicable to the ield of business ethics and many 
other areas of practical concern. Secondly, it is not clear who 
is to be included in the community of practitioners. This is 
because MacIntyre is not clear about the kind and degree of 
experience necessary for inclusion. Thirdly, it is not clear 
whether, for instance, portrait painting and landscape paint-
ing are separate practices or whether the generic activity of 
painting covers both. If we are unable to adequately distin-
guish between practitioners and non-practitioners or unable 
to adequately distinguish between diferent practices, then 
it seems that the concept will remain unhelpfully vague, and 
so again will be limited in terms of applicability.
In the following section, I will explore the charge that 
MacIntyre’s concept cannot account for productive activi-
ties. I concede that Hager’s allegation is not without war-
rant, and accept that there is an asymmetry between pro-
ductive and non-productive practices, but I argue that we 
can nevertheless make sense of certain productive activities 
as practices, and ofer a close reading of MacIntyre’s dis-
cussion of practices in order to establish this. In order to 
properly answer Hager’s charge, I then go on to elaborate 
on the limits of engagement in a practice, and argue that 
the conditions for community membership in the relevant 
sense are necessarily broad and blurred. In highlighting this 
elasticity, and arguing that we need not be procrustean in 
our understanding of practices, I also hope to defuse Hager’s 
third challenge, the problem of generic activities.
Progress and Production in Practices
According to Lawton and Páez, the question of whether lead-
ership or business count as practices is unresolved (2014, 
p. 643), which suggests that the scope of the concept is in 
need of clariication. However, this concern is not new. Ever 
since Hauerwas and Waddell (1982) questioned MacIntyre’s 
decision to include architecture but exclude bricklaying in 
his original set of examples, there have been recurrent sug-
gestions that MacIntyre’s concept does not adequately apply 
to predominantly productive activities. Hartman notes that 
MacIntyre “does not give an adequate account of the circum-
stances under which work may be intrinsically good” (2015, 
p. 167), and indeed spends much time detailing the ways 
in which MacIntyre’s ethics does not satisfactorily apply to 
the contemporary corporation. Similarly, Miller has argued 
that MacIntyre’s deinition works in cases where the practice 
“consists entirely in the internal goods achieved by partici-
pants and the contemplation of those achievements by oth-
ers” (1994, p. 250), but not in cases of productive activities. 
Because all businesses must be ‘productive’ in some sense, 
this charge must be answered if MacIntyre’s concept is to be 
applied to the kinds of productive enterprises in which much 
modern work takes place.
Hager notes that MacIntyre “was strongly inluenced by 
examples of games with not enough consideration being 
given to other practical and productive activities” (2011, p. 
548). MacIntyre does indeed repeatedly illustrate his con-
cept with reference to “games, sciences and arts” (2007, p. 
190) and spends considerably less time discussing produc-
tive activities. At this point, it may seem that MacIntyre is 
guilty merely of a sin of omission, which may be rectiied 
simply by elaborating on the goods internal to a productive 
practice or two. However, there are deeper reasons for think-
ing MacIntyre’s account of practices struggles to apply to 
productive activities. These include: (1) the historicism pre-
sent in MacIntyre’s deinition of a practice, (2) an additional 
reliance on references to the wider community in the case of 
productive practices, and (3) the fact that standards of excel-
lence typical of productive and non-productive practices are 
diferent. My aim is to explain why productive practices may 
be regarded as a problem for MacIntyre, and to show that 
the most efective to deal with this worry is to concede that 
there is an important asymmetry between productive and 
non-productive practices, but to argue that this does not 
undermine the possibility of productive practices.
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The inherent diiculty of accounting for practical and 
productive activities as practices becomes apparent when 
we return to MacIntyre’s deinition of practices. Consider 
the inal clause in MacIntyre’s deinition of a practice, the 
requirement that the realisation of goods internal to a prac-
tice must have “the result that… human conceptions of the 
ends and goods involved are systematically extended” (2007, 
p. 187, my emphasis). It is this inal clause that threatens 
to put the concept at odds with productive activities and 
presents an even greater challenge than Hager suggests. The 
requirement seems to rule out turnip-planting, but it also 
threatens to rule out farming because this ‘systematic exten-
sion’ seems to require a strongly historicist reading of the 
concept of a practice, in the sense that only those able to 
contribute to the historical development of an activity could 
be considered practitioners.
Farming and turnip-planting both have ends and goods, 
but is it far from clear exactly how these are to be systemati-
cally extended. In elaborating this inal and crucial clause 
of his deinition, MacIntyre claims that practices do not 
have set and stable goals, but rather that “the goods them-
selves are transmuted by the history of the activity” (2007, 
p. 194). Great painters and physicists transform their dis-
ciplines, and these activities have histories characterised 
by systematic extensions of conceptions of ends and goods 
internal to them. This is not, however, true of the history of 
MacIntyre’s examples of paradigmatic non-practices: turnip-
planting, tic-tac-toe or bricklaying. In this respect, farming 
seems to be closer to turnip-planting than it does to phys-
ics or painting. This is because farming seems not to have 
undergone the overarching transformations characteristic of 
the arts and sciences, in which the greatest practitioners have 
implemented audacious new ideas that have revolutionised 
the practice, and in which practitioners are conscious of, 
and partially in dialogue with, the greats of the past. Qua 
productive practice, farming is not—or rather, given that 
we cannot foresee the future of farming, does not seem to 
be—characterised by the historical development typical of 
arts, games, and sciences, i.e. the more paradigmatic exam-
ples of practices.
Farming has indeed changed over time, with the advent 
of new technologies and growth in relevant scientiic knowl-
edge, or due to changing attitudes to issues such as pollution 
and organic food, but this history is not characterised by the 
same transmutation of goals as the histories of painting or 
physics. Where farming has changed signiicantly, in terms 
of fertilizers, machinery, and selective breeding, the change 
has come largely from developments in other practices, such 
as chemistry, engineering, and genetics. Such changes have 
increased eiciency and have helped develop new techniques 
and strategies appropriate to farming, but they have not sys-
tematically extended our understanding of the ends of farm-
ing. They are simply not those kinds of changes. The internal 
goods we might associate with farming, such as stewardship 
of the land, and the joys of cultivating animals and plants, 
do not seem to be susceptible to the historical progression 
characteristic of the more clearly paradigmatic practices.
A farmer who travelled in time from the twelfth century 
to present would be amazed by how farming is carried out, 
but not by what farming is trying to do. A twelfth-century 
painter would be amazed by both the techniques and the 
aims of contemporary painting. MacIntyre seems to have 
something similar in mind when he notes that “a farmer 
has to arrive through her or his work at a highly particular 
set of notions of what good farming is on this particular 
terrain, in this particular climate, with this kind of plough, 
and this kind of labor force”, whereas “the musician or the 
painter may be as surprised as anyone else when the end 
to which they have directed their activities emerges as this 
performance or that portrait” (2016, p. 50 emphasis in origi-
nal). The practice of farming may deal in particularities, but 
painting and music allow for surprises.
To conclude from this, that productive activities are 
excluded from the realm of practices would be incorrect, 
however. Although MacIntyre is not entirely clear about 
what he means by ‘systematic extension’, he does leave 
clues about how we might rescue the notion of a practice 
from this excessively historicist reading. MacIntyre notes 
that practices are “those modes of activity within which ends 
have to be discovered and rediscovered, and means devised 
to pursue them” (2007, p. 273). If it were only the case that 
ends had to be discovered, then it would be hard to resist a 
strongly historicist reading that would rule farming and most 
productive practices out of contention for the status of prac-
tice, but as the rediscovery of ends is part of a practice this 
need not be so. A systematic extension need not be aggrega-
tive. Instead, we should read ‘systematic extension’ as con-
trasting with piecemeal extensions, i.e. extensions in which 
one aspect of a practice is extended without that extension 
having some relevance to a greater whole.
When someone is in the process of becoming a farmer, he 
or she does not learn how to carry out one task in isolation 
from how it is interconnected with a whole host of other 
tasks. Here, we have a way of understanding the ‘system-
atic extension’ clause that is not only compatible with the 
weaker historicism of the rediscovery of ends, but one which 
also its well with the observation that engagement can be 
partial. The distinction between discovery and rediscovery 
is similar to Boden’s (2003) distinction between historical 
and psychological creativity. We may well want to privilege 
historical creativity, i.e. the kind of creativity which leads to 
new ideas arising for the irst time in human history, when 
accounting for what is most valuable overall, but it is the 
psychological experience of creatively engaging in an activ-
ity, of discovering its ends and goods for oneself, that is both 
intrinsically satisfying and most important to an account of 
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moral education. We will return to the topic of the subjective 
experience of goods in the inal section.
An understanding of ‘systematic extension’ in which 
ends are only discovered rather than both discovered and 
rediscovered would suggest that only those activities in 
which creativity and novelty are part of the aim, such as 
arts, games, and sciences, could count as practices and per-
haps even that only those capable of signiicant innovations 
could count as genuine practitioners, clearly ruling out the 
partially engaged, a category which arguably includes man-
agers and employees in practice-related industries, a point 
we will address in the following section. This is because an 
outright, sui generis discovery is liable to change the prac-
tice as a whole. In this case, the likes of Einstein, Picasso, 
and Rod Laver would be almost alone as practitioners in 
the twentieth century, joined only by a relative handful of 
other innovative greats. A systematic extension that involves 
the rediscovery of internal goods, on the other hand, allows 
that individual practitioners and groups of practitioners can 
deepen their understanding of a practice by rediscovering for 
themselves what prior and contemporary practitioners have 
already learned. So, when a farmer or a painter or a physi-
cist learns the skills necessary to partake in those respective 
practices, they are personally discovering and historically 
rediscovering the ends and goods involved.
If this account is correct, the fundamental asymmetry 
between predominantly productive and predominantly non-
productive practices would remain, productive practices 
would still not typically possess goods “transmuted by 
the history of the activity” (ibid, p. 194), but we are better 
placed to see how productive activities can be made sense 
of in MacIntyrean terms. An examination of the notion of 
‘systematic extension’ shows that we can make sense of 
productive activities as practices. So, while Hager is prob-
ably correct to say that MacIntyre’s own discussion in After 
Virtue paid less attention to productive activities than would 
have been ideal, this lack of attention, perhaps inevitable in 
a work of such breadth, is not seriously damaging.
This brings us to the second reason for accepting an 
asymmetry between productive and non-productive prac-
tices: the role played by the relevant community. In Mac-
Intyre’s (1994) discussion of productive practices, in which 
he gives the example of the ishing crew as a practice-based 
community, the kind of life provided by membership of that 
community takes centre stage. The key motivating goods are 
“the goods of the common life of such a crew” (MacIntyre 
1994, p. 185), and the life of the ishing village as a whole is 
given special prominence. Indeed, in this example the activ-
ity of ishing itself, and the internal goods it may provide, 
is probably secondary to participation in the community, 
a community which is not focused on the goods internal 
to ishing in anything like the same way as a chess club is 
focused on the goods internal to chess. Indeed, MacIntyre 
claims that the good of a ishing crew is inherently bound 
up with “three related common goods, those of family, crew, 
and local community” (2016, p. 179).
Given MacIntyre’s Aristotelian understanding of poli-
tics, which involves the making and sustaining forms of 
human community (2007, p. 195) as opposed to engaging 
with large-scale nation states, this suggests that productive 
practices are intimately related to the practice of politics. 
Community membership is at the core of engagement in 
productive practices, whereas in non-productive practices 
the role of community remains crucially important, but is 
not quite as central. In predominantly non-productive prac-
tices, engagement supports and facilitates a pursuit of the 
goods distinctive of the activity in question, which can be 
speciied independently of that communal support even if 
they are not, as a matter of fact, really available without it. 
By contrast, “[i]ndividuals who farm need to regard them-
selves as contributing to a larger project” (2016, p. 171), 
which suggests the goods internal to farming make neces-
sary reference beyond those distinctive goods. The practice 
of politics, and the reliance on the role played by the com-
munity, highlights how diferent alleged examples of produc-
tive practices are from more paradigmatic, predominantly 
non-productive cases.
Clearly, we can enjoy both the intrinsic rewards and the 
moral education provided by chess even if we are only occa-
sional players, as is the case in most engagement in practices. 
Most people who play chess do not do so professionally, nor 
indeed do they join chess clubs. Likewise, most engagement 
in productive activities, including productive practices, tends 
to be part of paid employment. However, this is not to deny 
that the role a practice plays in someone’s life is important. 
Again, we can admit an asymmetry between predominantly 
productive and non-productive practices while retaining the 
view that this asymmetry does not imperil the category of 
productive practice. However, there are greater challenges 
in the case of productive practices, which will sometimes be 
best approached as though they are sites of the practice of 
politics, as Sinnicks (2014) has suggested, a topic we will 
return to below.
As I suggested above, there is a third reason to believe 
that a fundamental asymmetry exists between productive 
and non-productive practices: to excel in a productive prac-
tice requires us to be more concerned with outcomes than 
is the case in non-productive practices, and often continued 
employment will depend upon successfully delivering such 
outcomes. This is perhaps the most important of the three 
reasons for recognising this asymmetry. Most engagement 
in a practice is concerned with outcomes to some degree. 
Chess players aim at victory, after all. However, it is possible 
to lose regularly at chess and still be an excellent player. This 
may be because the competition consists of other excellent 
players, or where one possesses some particular strategic 
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deiciency that undermines otherwise excellent play. This is 
in contrast to productive practices like farming, or in busi-
ness more generally. Periods of severe drought notwith-
standing, it scarcely makes sense to describe someone as an 
excellent farmer if he or she regularly fails to produce food. 
This is not to say that the goods of farming are limited to 
producing food, but it does suggest that engagement in a pro-
ductive practice requires a prioritisation of certain external 
goods that far exceeds that present in predominantly non-
productive practices. This basic principle holds of business 
more generally, and any business which fails to be produc-
tive in this sense will not be a business for long.
If there were a way to vastly increase the eiciency of 
farming, and therefore at least one of the external goods of 
farming, so that more food be produced or less land used, 
at some cost of its internal goods, then we would ordinarily 
expect a good farmer to judge it to be worth losing some 
of the distinctive satisfactions of farming for that greater 
productivity. Not only has this happened to a signiicant 
degree, but much farming today seems to be rather discon-
nected from any internal good. While it is possible that the 
hope MacIntyre holds for farming is a result of a “romantic 
aversion to urban life” (D’Andrea 2006, p. 425), the growth 
of industrial farming has meant that the work carried out 
by agricultural machine operatives, and the work that takes 
place on factory farms, is about as far from MacIntyre’s 
description of a practice as an occupation can be. By con-
trast, no increase in eiciency at producing a victory in 
chess—by, per impossibile, memorising complex and hith-
erto unknown checkmate ‘tricks’—would justify sacriic-
ing the goods internal to chess, and nor does it seem pos-
sible for chess to become as disconnected from its internal 
goods as it is for a productive activity such as farming. If 
a predominantly productive practice could be made vastly 
more eicient through greater automation, then we would 
likely implement such a change. We would not, however, 
want chess to be played only by automatons, no matter how 
brilliant.
This important diference allows some kinds of practices, 
i.e. non-productive practices, to be relatively unconstrained, 
and so gives the relevant practitioners the scope to transform 
their practices so that conceptions of ends and goods can be 
extended. Truly excellent artists change the art community’s 
understanding of great art by revealing the possibilities of art 
itself, but the opportunity for those engaged in productive 
practices to excel in this way is, if not entirely absent, then 
at least severely reduced, as I noted earlier.
This asymmetry suggests that engagement in productive 
practices is likely to be less obvious than it is in more para-
digmatic cases. The examples given at the outset of applica-
tions of the concept of a practice have focused on jobs such 
as management, investment advising, PR, etc., rather than 
on more obviously paradigmatic examples such as chess, 
painting and so on, precisely because the former are conten-
tious cases, whereas the latter obviously answer to MacIn-
tyre’s deinition. Productive practices are compromised by 
necessity. They must necessarily aim at something other than 
the excellences and goods characteristic, and indeed partially 
deinitive of, the practice itself. This is the essence of Mac-
Intyre’s critique of market economies. The necessary focus 
on success, understood in terms of external goods, serves to 
undermine the extent to which devotion to internal goods is 
possible. However, it need not destroy such devotion. Indeed, 
there is signiicant scope for individuals who are appropri-
ately committed to goods internal to productive practices 
to pursue them. This pursuit may not always be easy, as the 
example of Elaine the ictional architect running through 
Moore’s Virtue At Work (2017) suggests. In this illustration, 
Elaine’s love of excellent buildings and her appreciation 
of the creativity characteristic of her work—when things 
are in good order—allow her to avoid the countervailing 
pressure working in a productive practice can exert. While 
this pressure may serve to push those engaged in produc-
tive practices in the direction of the periphery, as it were, 
there is no reason to think that they are pushed all the way, 
as Moore’s example demonstrates. It does mean that there 
are limits to what conceptual accounts of particular activi-
ties can achieve, however, and it does mean that in order to 
defend MacIntyre against Hager’s challenge we need to look 
more closely at the notion of engagement in a practice.
The Limits of Engagement
Hager claims that “MacIntyre’s examples leave it unclear 
what the criteria are for inclusion in communities engaged 
in a practice” (2011, p. 550). If this is so, then it seems 
that the practical applicability of the concept must be called 
into question. As we have seen, MacIntyre ofers a detailed 
deinition of practices, but if good grounds for including or 
excluding particular agents from the category of practition-
ers are lacking, then the concept will be of little empiri-
cal use. While Hager’s concerns are well founded to some 
degree, this is due not to a fault in MacIntyre’s explanation 
of the concept, but rather to the nature of practices as activi-
ties which can be fully appreciated only by the initiated, and 
admit gradations of engagement. Therefore, my aim in this 
section is to defuse Hager’s challenge by ofering an analysis 
of the concept of engagement in a practice. In order to do 
this, I explore the elasticity of the concept of a practice and 
argue that this elasticity is not seriously problematic. If those 
at the fringes of a practice can still be morally educated 
by it, then it is unnecessary for MacIntyre, or those who 
seek to apply his work, to be able to provide speciic criteria 
regarding precisely where the border between practitioner 
and non-practitioner lies. Aristotle wisely counsels that “we 
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should not seek the same degree of exactness in all sorts 
of arguments alike” (NE 1094b), and the nature of prac-
tices means some ambiguity will be inevitable. Indeed, we 
should be wary of trying to construct a procrustean concept 
of practices. The inscrutability of practices to the uninitiated 
renders general applications of the concept problematic, and 
so decisions about the limits of engagement in any particu-
lar practice are best left to masters of the relevant practice. 
However, this question of scope becomes more pronounced 
when we consider the relatively porous border between prac-
titioners and non-practitioners.
When discussing the relationship between practitioners 
and their relevant communities, MacIntyre says “whether 
we are painters or physicists or quarterbacks or indeed just 
lovers of good painting or irst-rate experiments or a well-
thrown pass”, we must subordinate “ourselves within the 
practice in our relationship to other practitioners” (2007, p. 
191). He also notes that the “enjoyments of those who play 
games as diferent as soccer, cricket, and chess with great 
skill are matched by the enjoyments of those spectators who 
combine an appreciation of those skills with the devotion 
of fans” (2016, pp. 132–133). This means that those at the 
periphery of a practice are engaged in it, albeit partially, 
and can therefore be considered practitioners too. This is 
one reason why scholarly discussions of the concept are 
not entirely self-defeating. While practices are cognitively 
closed to some degree, partial engagement means that those 
who have not mastered a practice can have some understand-
ing of that practice, and write meaningfully about it for an 
audience of non-masters. Lovers of great paintings who do 
not themselves paint can be morally educated by their role 
as practitioners, diners as well as chefs can derive more than 
aesthetic pleasure from excellent cookery, and “the high 
school physics teacher and the analyst of the data provided 
by the Large Hadron Collider are contributing to one and the 
same enterprise” (MacIntyre 2013, p. 209).
Those at the periphery of a practice may not have the 
intimate experience of the relevant internal goods of mas-
ter-practitioners. However, they must nevertheless develop 
certain virtues in order to be able to appreciate the goods 
internal to that practice. They must still recognise their ini-
tial ignorance and need for tuition, etc., and so there remains 
a possibility that such an engagement will be morally edu-
cative. Because engagement can be partial, participation in 
practices need not be monomaniacal for their ethical efects 
to be felt. The notion that lovers of a well-thrown pass are 
engaged in a practice, and can therefore be morally improved 
by this love, goes some way towards showing how ubiqui-
tous practice-engagement can be and is.
An engagement in practices that is both far from all-con-
suming and is very much concerned with the achievement 
of external goods can still be morally educative. To illus-
trate this, I will draw on the example of sports and sports 
fans. Just as in business, where “interpersonal competition 
is expected, accepted, praised, and routinely encouraged” 
(Pfefer and Sutton 2006, p. 64), the sports fan’s engagement 
with the sport in question may often be inseparable from the 
enjoyment of competition and the desire for victory (though 
not all victories are equal, and we will come to the impor-
tance of personal commitment to internal goods below). This 
may distinguish it from the less adulterated focus on internal 
goods characteristic of an engagement in non-competitive 
practices, but this does not rule out an appreciation of the 
relevant internal goods entirely.
Indeed, sport provides an especially useful example for 
three reasons. Firstly, sports are typically paradigmatic 
examples of practices, secondly, engagement in them tends 
to be partial rather than all-consuming, and thirdly because 
they straddle the productive/non-productive divide to some 
degree, given that sports are industries as well as practices. 
Sport provides, therefore, perhaps the clearest connection 
between the ‘ethics of amateurism’, which seems to it most 
naturally with MacIntyre’s discussion of practices, and busi-
ness ethics, i.e. the ethics of a domain in which proit and 
productivity are of vital importance. As such, the example 
of sport allows us to raise questions relevant to an applica-
tion of MacIntyre’s ethics to business ethics without enter-
ing into contentious debates about which particular indus-
tries and businesses count as practices and practice-based 
communities.
One possible objection to consider here is that the level 
of engagement characteristic of sports fans is simply not 
meaningful enough to lead to the moral education practices 
ought to be capable of providing and that it is intuitively 
implausible to claim that people on the fringes of a practice, 
a lover of great painting or a well-thrown pass, can actually 
acquire virtues from their apparently passive admiration for 
the work of others. It may seem deeply counter-intuitive to 
claim that such fans can acquire virtues from so minimal 
an ‘engagement’ in a practice, i.e. by simply watching their 
favourite sports teams or athletes, given that passivity of 
such an activity if nothing else. Our ordinary experience of 
persons who have seriously committed themselves to prac-
tices like chess or physics, or indeed particular sports, makes 
it intuitively plausible that their engagement with the prac-
tice in question can provide a moral education, and it would 
hardly be a bold conjecture to suggest that our experience 
of sports fans is rather diferent from this.
However, there are two points worth making here. Firstly, 
we should note that MacIntyre refers to “lovers of a well-
thrown pass” (my emphasis) and not to partisan fans who 
simply support their team. Such fans may care only about 
whether their team achieves the external good of victory, 
and be unconcerned with whether that victory is achieved 
by fair means or foul. Even minimal engagement in the sense 
required presupposes a respect for the internal standards of 
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excellence deinitive of the sport in question, a respect that 
increases the intrinsic satisfactions of being a spectator [a 
category Hager suspects will be excluded from the commu-
nity of practitioners (2011, p. 550)]. This means that a Mac-
Intyrean position on the morally educative power of spec-
tatorship will have some ainity with Mumford’s account 
of the aesthetics of spectatorship. Mumford aims to bring 
“the aesthetics of art and sport… closer together” (2012, 
p. 7) and suggests that in this regard there is a distinction 
to be made between partisan fans, who support one team, 
and purists, who “watch sport for more aesthetic and intel-
lectual reasons” (ibid). This is not a hard and fast dichotomy, 
but it seems likely that any moral education resulting from 
spectatorship will require at least some degree of purism, 
in Mumford’s sense, even if the likely focus on success acts 
as a countering force, as I suggested above. In MacIntyre’s 
recounting of the life of CLR James, he notes that the lat-
ter saw cricket as “an art, just as literature and music are” 
(2016, p. 289) and something that can teach us the virtue 
of restraint (ibid, p. 275) as a “tradition of thought, judge-
ment, and action” (ibid, p. 289). As a gifted intellectual and 
journalist, James may be an exceptional case, but there is 
no reason why this form of understanding cannot be more 
broadly available. This takes us on to the second point.
Just as engagement can be partial so can virtue acquisi-
tion. Someone who cares about the internal goods of a sport 
may well be dissatisied if his or her team employs under-
hand tactics, openly harangues oicials in the hope of pres-
suring them into giving favourable decisions, and generally 
behaves in a cynical fashion. A fan may also raise questions 
about owners of teams, and may be dissatisied with own-
ers who treat their favoured teams merely as proit-seeking 
enterprises, and thus without regard to the distinctive goods 
of the sport in question. Such a fan may have developed 
a subtle and sophisticated grasp of the tactics, and have 
expanded his or her intellectual capabilities in so doing, or 
had a chance to develop the virtues of diligence or patience 
through the study of tactics and their best application. He or 
she may also have begun to develop the excellences of char-
acter required to fully appreciate the aesthetic qualities of 
the sport in question, or begin to appreciate the importance 
of teamwork and courage as exempliied by the athletes—
who are, ceteris paribus, more deeply engaged practition-
ers—themselves. In both cases, the sports fan may have had 
to display the humility and self-honesty to recognise that 
other members of the relevant community (be they histori-
ans, insightful journalists or pundits of the sport, or simply 
more experienced fellow fans) possess a greater degree of 
expertise and so a greater ability to judge. No one goes from 
knave to megalopsychos simply by tuning into the Olympics, 
no matter how attentive a viewer. Camus may have learned 
all he knew about morality and obligations from football, 
but these lessons would have been harder to learn from the 
side-lines.
The ethical lessons learned by being a sports fan may 
be relatively modest, and in some cases, they will be too 
modest to notice, because similar lessons are readily avail-
able to those who dislike sport. Furthermore, because of the 
ubiquity of practices in human life, the virtue(s) acquired by 
spectatorship may be over-determined. Nevertheless, partial 
engagement need not be morally vacuous. If this is so, then 
we have grounds for optimism as it suggests that forms of 
employment that fall short of a deep engagement in a prac-
tice can still be morally educative to some degree, thereby 
broadening the possible scope of MacIntyrean analyses of 
business and enabling us to sidestep Hager’s second scope 
problem.
The manager of an art gallery who admires art but lacks 
the abilities required to become an artist may likewise enjoy 
some intrinsic satisfaction from admiring the work displayed 
in the gallery, from making curatorial appointments based 
on the aesthetic merits of candidates’ previous work, and 
may therefore receive a moral education from this relatively 
meagre engagement. Neither the satisfaction nor the moral 
education compares to that experienced by the artists them-
selves, but this does not mean they are non-existent. In such 
marginal cases, the role of the community becomes even 
more important than it is in more obviously paradigmatic 
cases, as I noted above. Indeed, in less paradigmatic cases 
a robust, supportive community may prove to be absolutely 
indispensable for the activity to be morally educative. The 
gifted and well-trained painter, who needs no further formal 
tuition, may be able to continue to deepen his or her appre-
ciation of the relevant standards of excellence by consulting 
historical examples of such excellence. In marginal cases, 
however, discussing the internal goods of a particular prac-
tice with other practitioners may be required for a meaning-
ful engagement with that practice, and thus for an experience 
of those internal goods. Membership of a practice-based 
community, therefore, becomes a more signiicant correc-
tive and guide in cases where engagement is partial.
So, Hager’s claim that it is unclear where we ought to 
set the limits of engagement is well founded, but it is not 
as damaging as it might have initially appeared. The rela-
tively inclusive account of practice-engagement I have out-
lined here allows for applications of the concept in general, 
and, most pertinently for our concerns, to business ethics 
in particular because it allows those who play a variety of 
roles in support of a practice (e.g. managers, owners) to 
be accounted practitioners who are at the periphery of a 
practice. While the standards of excellence characteris-
tic of productive practices are importantly diferent from 
those characteristic of paradigmatic practices, as I argued 
in the previous section, this asymmetry does not render 
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productive activities incapable of providing intrinsic sat-
isfaction and moral education.
By analysing the concept of engagement in a practice, 
we have not given an unambiguous answer to the question 
of who is and is not a practitioner, but we have seen why 
this does not pose a serious threat to the concept. Moreo-
ver, the deinitive feature of practice-engagement is being 
motivated by the relevant internal goods, which we will 
come to below and which necessarily remains out of reach 
for the kind of conceptual argument ofered in this section.
The argument developed here also broadly applies to 
the third of Hager’s scope problems, that posed by generic 
activities. Hager says “is it not plausible to maintain that, 
say, beef production is a diferent practice from rice grow-
ing? It seems clear that the internal goods in the two cases 
would difer markedly” (2011, p. 551), and so MacIntyre’s 
use of generic terms, ‘farming’, ‘ishing’, ‘architecture’, 
etc., may be unacceptable if we regard these diferent 
activities as possessing irreducibly diverse internal goods.
However, just as it is unnecessary to draw a deinite bor-
der between those engaged in a practice and those who are 
not, there is no need for deinite borders between related 
practices. Rice farming and beef farming, to continue with 
Hager’s example, have diferent histories and communi-
ties, and so presumably the masters most centrally and 
deeply engaged in these practices will experience subtly 
diferent internal goods. However, because of the evident 
similarities, those whose engagement is less central may 
receive an identical moral education from their level of 
engagement. Indeed, if my analysis of partial engagement 
is correct, then the master rice farmer may know enough 
about farming as a whole to be comparable to those at the 
periphery of another type of farming.
Similar claims can be made about many other closely 
related practices. A ield hockey player and an ice hockey 
player may possess an insight into the goods of each 
other’s sport. A logician may have an appreciation of 
the goods internal to both computer science and meta-
physics. So again, the impossibility of deciding on the 
precise scope of a practice is not a fatal weakness, but 
rather relects a recognition that each practice will share 
key features with other, related practices and that in the 
case of generic activities, it is these connections that often 
warrant the use of a single overarching label used to cat-
egorise them. The vagueness of the deinition corresponds 
to the open-ended nature of the activities in question. Both 
beef farming and rice farming are called ‘farming’ with 
good reason. Hager’s scope problems do not undermine 
MacIntyre’s concept, but nevertheless its scope remains 
somewhat unclear. Therefore, the following section will 
ofer some suggestions about the applicability of the con-
cept of practices within business ethics.
Moral Education at Work
Analysing the nature of football may give us reason to con-
clude that football is a practice. Certainly, it is an activity 
that possesses distinctive goods and can be both intrinsi-
cally satisfying and morally educative. However, the moti-
vations of particular agents determine the extent to which 
football actually does provide intrinsic satisfaction or a 
moral education. Any list of examples of practices is, in an 
important sense, provisional and fallible. Even though it 
is diicult to imagine turnip-planting supplanting physics 
as an example of a paradigmatic practice, further evidence 
may emerge that results in a paradigm shift in our thinking 
about activities that are intrinsically rewarding and mor-
ally educative. Any such paradigm shift will be at least 
partly a result of the experience and testimony of those 
engaged in the activities in question, and this subjective 
element is essential to the concept of a practice.
To borrow Susan Wolf’s phrase about meaning in life, 
proper engagement in a practice exists “when subjec-
tive attraction meets objective attractiveness” (2010, p. 
78). Subjective satisfaction is logically secondary to the 
objective features which mark an activity out as a practice, 
but it is necessary. The activity must be complex, coher-
ent, socially established, and so on, but the participant 
must at some point be motivated by the relevant internal 
goods to be accounted a practitioner. A footballer who 
performs only for the money is not engaged in football in 
this sense—despite actually performing that activity with 
a considerable degree, perhaps even an exceptional degree, 
of skill, as MacIntyre notes (2007, p. 274). Nevertheless, 
it is diicult to imagine a professional athlete only being 
concerned with external goods and almost impossible to 
imagine someone coming to have that degree of skill with-
out a concern for the internal goods, at least to begin with. 
While, as Whysall points out, “modern elite sport is clearly 
distant from the idealistic world of fair play and amateur 
ideals, relecting increasing pressures of professionalisa-
tion, commercialisation and commodiication” (2014, p. 
426), a love of the game may well be a prerequisite to the 
dedication required to become a professional footballer, 
which indicates the need for empirical investigation into 
the commitment and motivation of particular agents. So 
conceptual arguments can point us in the direction of areas 
where empirical research is likely to be fruitful. With this 
in mind, I will outline several possible areas of applica-
tion which are likely to illustrate the potential breadth of 
MacIntyre’s concept: (1) work focusing on narrative and 
MacIntyre’s ‘practices/institutions’ framework, (2) work 
on small business and on trade unions which focuses on 
the practice of politics, (3) broader applications based on 
‘consumption’ of work.
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Empirical investigations using MacIntyre’s ‘practices-
institutions’ framework (e.g. Beadle 2013; Beadle and 
Könyöt 2006; Moore 2012b; Robson 2015; Bernacchio 
and Couch 2015) have already demonstrated its usefulness. 
Much of this work is narrative-focused and so allows for the 
kinds of discussions about goods and ends which are neces-
sary to practices, and therefore for the relationships required 
by a narrative that is genuinely shaped by goods internal to 
that practice. A narrative-focused approach provides insight 
into the work of people who understand themselves as sub-
ordinate to the good of the activity in question. Such studies 
are important and illuminating; however, I wish to suggest 
some other, broader avenues worthy of exploration.
One such avenue is that of small businesses. Given Mac-
Intyre’s claim that practice-based communities must be rela-
tively small-scale and local (MacIntyre 1999), the problem 
of scale confronts anyone serious about applying MacIn-
tyre’s thought to modern institutions and, as I noted above, 
the role of the community becomes even more pronounced 
in cases of partial engagement, as much employment is 
likely to be. Furthermore, as Hendry points out, there “is 
evidence in particular that small companies within a geo-
graphic region see themselves not merely as competitors but 
as members of a moral community with reciprocal ties and 
obligations” (2001, p. 212), which suggests there is scope 
for studies which take the business, practitioners (or proto-
practitioners), and the local community into consideration. 
Furthermore, Payne et al. (2011) found that family irms are 
more likely to be characterised by empathy (the best indi-
cator of genuine ethical commitment according to Batson 
2011). While it is clear that not just any small business will 
necessarily be a practice-based community, small businesses 
may well be a good place to look for the moral education 
provided by a partial engagement in a practice, and in par-
ticular by the practice of politics. Similarly, another pos-
sible avenue for future work inspired by MacIntyre’s moral 
theory to explore is the community provided by trade unions, 
which MacIntyre has claimed are “necessary for the good 
life under any form of capitalism” (2008a, p. 275), and even 
that militant trade union action is necessary to achieve even 
“elementary justice” in contemporary society (2016, p. 107). 
Trade unions are certainly concerned to sustain communal 
goods from the corrupting inluence of institutions (even 
though unions, qua bureaucratic entities, can themselves be 
corrupting institutions), and so again are best approached as 
likely sites of engagement in the practice of politics.
While it may be true that some industries and some jobs 
are impossible to make sense of in MacIntyrean terms (for 
instance banking, according to MacIntyre 2015), there is 
reason to believe a broader application of the concept of 
practices is feasible, and indeed worthwhile. Even if we do 
not think it is likely that many contemporary organisations 
will be able to house practices, and even if we agree with 
MacIntyre’s claim that the modern economic order “pro-
vides systematic incentives to develop a type of character 
that has a propensity to injustice” (1995, p. xiv), we must 
also remember that the modern economic order cannot fully 
destroy the systematic incentives to develop a just character 
that are present in almost all human social formations, and 
which supports MacIntyre’s claim that “plain persons are in 
fact generally and to a signiicant degree proto-Aristotelians” 
(1992, p. 5). This is to say even if our culture is relatively 
inhospitable to the virtues, as MacIntyre himself thinks, it 
cannot entirely undermine our moral agency and ability to 
acquire the virtues. Indeed, this feature of contemporary life 
is what prevents MacIntyre’s move from discussing prac-
tices in After Virtue to discussing relatively prosaic forms 
of work in Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity seeming like 
a radical departure. This means that even in industries and 
workplaces that do not focus on the pursuit of internal goods 
as a central aim, agents may still be able to resist the system-
atic incentives to injustice, and engage in both the practice 
of sustaining their community, and the practice which their 
work constitutes an engagement in, if any. This prevalence 
of proto-Aristotelianism provides motivation to explore how 
and why people choose to pursue the careers they do.
While the dominance of consumerism in our society is 
often regarded as being deeply undesirable because, for 
instance, it undermines communal life (Segal 1999), encour-
ages the depletion of natural resources (Cohen and Murphy 
2001), and corrupts children and infantilises adults (Barber 
2008), consumerism itself, qua choice of goods and ser-
vices in line with personal preference, need not be morally 
problematic. Due to changes to employment in the last few 
decades, such as a decrease in job security, and a lattening 
of organisations leading to fewer career opportunities, not to 
mention the demise in traditional ways of life, research into 
the ‘psychological contract’ between employers and employ-
ees (e.g. Rousseau 1995; Conway and Briner 2005; George 
2009) suggests that work is now increasingly regarded as an 
object of consumption. Employees are now more focused 
on training opportunities, lexibility, and the extent to which 
work is fulilling. Clearly consumerism can be good if it 
serves some good end rather than being an end in itself. 
Consider Keat’s (2008) remarks on consumer goods.
One buys a loaf of bread, and then eats it at home, 
often sharing it with family or friends. The example 
is banal, but says something important: although con-
sumer goods are ‘items of private property’, acquired 
through market transactions, they are typically enjoyed 
in the context of non-private, non-market activities and 
relationships. So if we want to understand and judge 
their value, we need to understand and judge what it is 
that they contribute to, and how signiicant that con-
tribution is (or can be) (2008, p. 249).
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Here, we can see the importance of considering the ‘for 
the sake of’ reasoning that goes into the consumer’s deci-
sion. An unthinking purchase of a loaf of bread as part of 
weekly grocery shopping may be interchangeable with a 
variety of similar products, whereas a carefully selected mar-
ble rye to serve at a dinner party might not be. And while 
the price of the marble rye is not insigniicant, and certainly 
the consumer will not ignore it, it is not the sole or even 
the primary focus. MacIntyre ofers the example of a child 
learning to play, and ultimately to appreciate, chess (2007, p. 
188). In this example, the child initially plays to be rewarded 
with candy, but eventually comes to experience the internal 
goods of chess, and no longer needs the extrinsic reward.
The case of work as an object of consumption is similar. 
What work is done for the sake of will be telling. If it is 
engaged in solely for the sake of payment, it will not be 
engaged with as a practice irrespective of whether the activ-
ity itself satisies the requirements of MacIntyre’s deinition, 
i.e. irrespective of its complexity, social-establishment and 
so on, a point made above with reference to football. If it 
is engaged in for some richer purpose, then it may consti-
tute practice-engagement, even if external goods, e.g. the 
salary, are considered to be highly important. Garcia-Ruiz 
and Rodriguez-Lluesma have persuasively argued that “con-
sumption decisions are frequently experienced as activities 
that are necessary for the achievement of the goods inter-
nal to practices” (2014, p. 525). The key point here is that 
consumption need not be passive, but can be informed by a 
virtuous conception of the good life. One prerequisite of our 
being able to meaningfully understand work as a potential 
object of virtuous consumption is that at least some degree 
of choice is often available to workers. Another is that work-
ers do not simply pursue jobs which pay the highest available 
salary or carry the most status. Neither of these conditions is 
as widespread as we would no doubt like them to be, but, in 
developed countries at least, neither is entirely rare.
Where these conditions hold, people can display their 
commitment to the good life by seeking practice-based work. 
This may be problematic if the consumeristic, individualis-
tic tendencies of job applicants preclude subordination to 
the practice or respect for the mastery of more seasoned 
practitioners. Empirical research might therefore draw on 
employee motivations, conception of the good life, etc. 
However, as MacIntyre’s ishermen example (1994, 2008b), 
in which crew members join for the pay and stay for the 
rewarding relationships provided by the community, shows, 
people do not need to seek out the practice in advance in 
order to be able to come to appreciate its internal goods, 
even though they must eventually come to appreciate these 
goods to be engaged in the practice qua practice. If this is 
so, then it is likely that people seeking work that satisies 
their pre-existing, untutored, but excellence-focused desires 
will be at least as able to appreciate the internal goods of 
their work, and make the sacriices that the practice demands 
of them. People who, perhaps vaguely and apart from any 
particular practice, want to do something ‘good’ may well 
initially think in terms of subjective preferences, but they 
are undeniably resistant to any conception of success that 
focuses primarily on external goods and so may easily ind 
themselves as ‘peripheral practitioners’, able to enjoy the 
intrinsic satisfactions and the moral education that work, at 
its best, can provide. Moore notes that within an organisa-
tion, there “will need to be a continuing debate about the 
purpose” it serves (2017, p. 18), and this may be all the 
invitation to engage in a practice that such recruits need, 
and is likely to facilitate the community that is conducive to 
such engagement.
Therefore, far from being inapplicable, as Hager’s scope 
problems threaten to render it, and far from being only nar-
rowly applicable, as a strongly historicist reading of MacIn-
tyre’s discussion of practices would suggest, there is scope 
to construe a wide variety of forms of work in terms of Mac-
Intyre’s concept of a practice. MacIntyre provides a robust 
ethical framework, and one that is not as elitist and severe as 
his reputation sometimes suggests. The foregoing discussion 
suggests that the concept of a practice is far from exclusion-
ary and that the bar for accepting a broadly MacIntyrean 
account of virtue, and of moral education at work, is not as 
high as is sometimes thought.
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